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Recent Decisions
Attorney-Client - Attorney May Be Liable To Beneficiaries For Negligence In Drafting Will. Lucas v. Hamm,
15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P. 2d 685 (1961). Plaintiffs, beneficiaries under testator's will, brought an action for damages against the defendant, an attorney whom the testator
had employed to draft the instrument. The attorney, in
attempting to carry out the testator's directions, drafted
a residual testamentary trust for the benefit of the plaintiffs which violated the Rule against Perpetuities. Due to
this error, the beneficiaries entered into a compromise
settlement with the testator's relatives whereby they received $75,000 less than they would have, had the residual
trust been properly drafted. When a judgment of dismissal
was entered on an order sustaining defendant's demurrer
to their complaint without leave to amend, the plaintiffs
appealed. The Supreme Court of California affirmed the
lower court's decision on the ground that the Rule against
Perpetuities was in such a state of perplexity and confusion in California that on the facts it was not negligence
for defendant to have violated the Rule. However, the
court expressly overruled a prior decision, Buckley v.
Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900 (1895), that had held that an
attorney was not liable to beneficiaries of a will for a mistake in drafting, and concluded (364 P. 2d 689) "that
intended beneficiaries of a will who lose their testamentary
rights because of failure of the attorney who drew the will
to properly fulfill his obligations under his contract with
the testator may recover as third-party beneficiaries," reasoning that "the main purpose of the testator in making
his agreement with the attorney is to benefit the persons
named in his will and this intent can be effectuated, in
the event of a breach by the attorney, only by giving the
beneficiaries a right of action. .. " Cf. Biakanja v. Irving,
49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P. 2d 16, 65 A.L.R. 2d 1358 (1958).
There is a paucity of authority on the attorney's liability to a beneficiary for negligence in drafting a will.
In Re Solicitor, ex parte Fitzpatrick, 54 Ont. L. 3, 1 D.L.R.
981, 13 B.R.C. 146 (1924), it was said that where there is
no privity of contract, an attorney is not liable to a beneficiary of a will which is negligently drafted. In Schirmer
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v. Nethercutt, 157 Wash. 172, 288 P. 265 (1930), a beneficiary was allowed to recover from an attorney with whom
he contracted to draw his grandmother's will for the
attorney's negligence in permitting a beneficiary to sign
as a witness. Cf. Ward v. Arnold, 52 Wash. 2d 581, 328 P.
2d 164 (1958) (beneficiary who contracted with attorney
to draw husband's will allowed recovery for attorney's
negligence in advising her a will was not necessary). For
further information see 65 A.L.R. 2d 1363 (1959); 43 A.L.R.
932 (1926). See also 7 C.J.S. 833, Attorney & Client, § 52;
3 M.L.E. 212, 217, Attorney & Client, §§ 31, 33.
Bankruptcy - Joint Creditor Can Have Bankrupt's
Estate Reopened And Consolidated With Wife's Subsequent Bankruptcy Proceeding. In Re Reid, 198 F. Supp.
689 (W.D. Va. 1961). The bankrupt had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy on May 3, 1960 and the estate was
closed on August 16, 1960. On October 18, 1960, his wife
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and shortly thereafter a joint creditor moved that the referee in bankruptcy reopen the bankrupt's estate and consolidate it
with his wife's proceeding in order to reach property held
by them as tenants by the entireties. The referee declined
and on petition for review the court ordered that the bankrupt's estate be reopened and consolidated with his wife's.
Pursuant to this order, the referee entered an order that
property held as tenants by the entireties be sold in order
to satisfy claims of joint creditors of the spouses. After a
hearing on the bankrupt's petition for review, the court,
in affirming the referee's order, held that under § 2(a) (8)
of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. § 11(a)(8) (1961)
which provides that courts of bankruptcy may "reopen
estates for cause shown", the joint creditors showing that
there was joint property which could only be reached by a
reopening of the bankrupt's estate and consolidating it with
his wife's was sufficient cause to warrant a reopening.
The court reasoned that it would be inequitable to allow
spouses to shield joint property from joint creditors by
having one obtain a discharge and have his estate closed
and shortly thereafter the other file a petition in bankruptcy when, had they both been in bankruptcy at the
same time, the two cases could be consolidated and joint
property could be applied to satisfy joint creditors. Roberts
v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F. 2d 943 (4th Cir. 1960).
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Prior to the Chandler Act of 1938, a court could only
reopen bankruptcy estates whenever it appeared "they
were closed before being fully administered." Thus, in
Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F. 2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931) the court
affirmed an order delaying the granting of a discharge in
bankruptcy to a bankrupt husband until a joint creditor
could subject property held as tenants by the entireties
by the bankrupt to judgment and execution in a state court,
on the ground that once the bankrupt had obtained a discharge the creditor could no longer subject the joint property to his claim. Generally it is said that the effect of the
Chandler Act amendment, which provides for reopening
for cause shown, is to give greater power to bankruptcy
courts to reopen estates. In Re Cirillo, 102 F. Supp. 715
(M.D. Pa. 1952). See also Baylor v. 1775 Broadway Corporation,146 F. 2d 487 (2d Cir. 1944). For further information see 6 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY, 605, §§ 2973, 2974
(1952); COLLIER BANKRUPTCY MANUAL,
2.09 at p. 51 (2d
ed. 1960).

Contempt-Failure Of Attorney To Appear As Ordered
For Sentencing Of Client. Chula v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 507, 368 P. 2d 107 (1962). The Superior Court ordered
the defendant, an attorney, to personally appear with his
client on March 31, 1961, at a sentencing hearing. On the
day of the hearing when the defendant failed to appear,
the court issued an order to show cause why the defendant should not be cited for contempt. At the contempt
hearing, after the defendant testified that he had been out
of town on business on March 31 and that he had appointed
a substitute to appear for him, the court issued an order
stating that the defendant had had the ability to appear
at the March 31 hearing, but failed to appear without
sufficient reason or excuse and was thus guilty of contempt.
The defendant petitioned for a writ of certiorari. The writ
was granted and the California Supreme Court in affirming the Superior Court, in a 4-3 decision, held that the
failure of an attorney to appear in court at the time
directed by the court without valid excuse is a direct contempt and punishable summarily. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC.
§ 1211 (1957). The court reasoned that since the absence
disrupted judicial proceedings it was therefore committed
in the immediate view and presence of the court. The dissent felt that such conduct could only constitute an in-
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direct contempt, and could not be punished summarily in
that the failure of an attorney to appear as ordered is not
a contempt unless unexcusable, and since the court does
not know whether the absence is excusable until it has
all the facts, notice and a hearing are required. Although
the dissent felt that the Superior Court took adequate
steps to satisfy the procedural requirements of a hearing
for indirect contempt, they did not agree that the defendant was guilty of contempt in that the defendant had
appointed an associate in his law firm to appear for him.
Cf. Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P. 2d 681
(1955).
Other jurisdictions which have considered this problem
have held that the failure of an attorney to appear when
ordered by court is not a contempt summarily punishable
because all the circumstances concerning the failure to
appear do not occur in the presence of the court and therefore the contempt should only be punished after there has
been an opportunity for a fair hearing. Bowles v. U.S.,
44 F. 2d 115 (4th Cir. 1930); Weiland v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 166 Ohio St. 62, 139 N.E. 2d 36 (1956);
State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 P. 793, 59 A.L.R.
1265 (1928). In Maryland, 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 26, § 4
enumerates those contempts which may be summarily
punished, one of which is "disobedience or resistance by
any officer of the said courts . . . to any writ, process,
order, rule, decree or command of the said courts." See
also MD. RULE P1 (1961). 2 MD. CODE (1961 Cum. Supp.)
Art. 26, § 5 provides for the different procedures to be used
in prosecuting direct and constructive contempts. For further information see 59 A.L.R. 1272 (1929); 5 M.L.E. 329ff,
Contempt, §§ 1, 2, 4, 6-8, particularly § 4; MD. RULES P3, P4
(1961); 5 Duke B.J. 155 (1956); 39 Minn. L. Rev. 895
(1955); 9 Vand. L. Rev. 93 (1955).

Contracts - Unpaid Pledges Subject To Garnishment
By Creditors Of Non-Profit Corporation. Petitionof Upper
Peninsula Development Bureau, 364 Mich. 179, 110 N.W.
2d 709 (1961). The petitioner, a non-profit corporation,
was engaged in promoting both the growth of industry
and the tourist business in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. When it discovered that it was financially embarrassed, it brought a proceeding for dissolution. The appellant, petitioner's creditor in connection with the promo-
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tion of the tourist business, intervened and petitioned that
a receiver be appointed to collect unpaid pledges of $18,353
which were made by individuals to aid in the promotion of
industrial growth. The lower court denied the relief requested and the creditor appealed. The Supreme Court
of Michigan, in modifying the lower court's decision, held
that unpaid pledges due a non-profit corporation could be
reached by the creditors of the corporation but that the
proper procedure in the instant case was by way of garnishment and not by appointing a receiver to collect them.
The Court reasoned that since these pledges were supported by a valid consideration, i.e., the mutual pledges
of others, as was plainly stated on the card signed by the
pledgor, they were valid obligations due to the corporation and the creditor could reach them by garnishment
proceedings.
Courts have usually sustained the suit of a non-profit
organization on a subscription agreement on two theories;
(1) that the promise of the charity to use the money for a
specific purpose or to do a specific thing requested is sufficient consideration to support the promise to subscribe,
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank;
246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927); In Re Couch's Estate,
170 Neb. 518, 103 N.W. 2d 274 (1960); (2) that under the
doctrine of promissory estoppel the promisor by his subscription should reasonably have expected to induce substantial action or forebearance on the part of the promisee
and the subscription has induced such action or forebearance that injustice can only be avoided by enforcement of
the subscription agreement; Gittings v. Mayhew, 6 Md. 113
(1854); Thompson v. McAllen Federated Women's Bldg.
Corp., 273 S.W. 2d 105 (Tex. 1954); Lake Bluff Orphanage
v. Magill's Ex'rs, 305 Ky. 391, 204 S.W. 2d 224 (1947).
Occasionally courts have indicated that the mutual promises of others to subscribe is sufficient consideration to support a subscription; Sterling v. Cushwa & Sons, 170 Md.
226, 183 A. 593 (1936) (subscription to guaranty fund of
bank); University of Southern California v. Bryson, 103
Cal. App. 39, 283 P. 949 (1929). But cf. American University
v. Collins, 190 Md. 688, 59 A. 2d 333 (1948) (particularly
the dissent). This view may be more advantageous to the
garnishing creditor of a defunct non-profit organization
since it may only be necessary for him to prove the mutual
subscriptions to support the enforceability of the pledges,
whereas under the former theories, the failure of the nonprofit organization to perform its promise will be a defense
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available to the subscriber in any garnishment proceeding
against him. See 11 M.L.E. 315, Garnishment, § 4. For
further information see 151 A.L.R. 1230 (1944); 115 A.L.R.
589 (1938); 95 A.L.R. 1305 (1935); 38 A.L.R. 868 (1925);
83 C.J.S. 734, Subscriptions, § 5; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 90, p. 110 and 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 116, p. 403.
Creditors' Rights - Delivery Of Fi Fa To Constable
Establishes Priority Of Judgment Creditor Over Subsequently Qualifying Trustee For Benefit Of Creditors Who
Takes Possession Of Personalty Prior To Levy Of Writ.
Max Kohner Inc. v. Wiegman, Daily Record, March 24,
1962 (Circuit Court of Baltimore City, 1962). The plaintiff
who had previously recovered a judgment against the defendant placed a writ of ft fa in the hands of the constable
of the People's Court of Baltimore City on November 28,
1961. Three days later on December 1, when the constable
went to levy on defendant's personal property, he found
the trustee for the benefit of defendant's creditors, who
had qualified as trustee subsequent to November 28, 1961
in possession of the defendant's personalty. At the instruction of the People's Court and over the objection of the
trustee, the constable levied on the property and it was
sold. The Circuit Court of Baltimore City, Allen J., in
holding that the judgment creditor had priority over the
trustee, reasoned that, although a mere judgment creditor
has no lien on personalty, a writ of ft fa creates a lien on
personalty in favor of the judgment creditor from the date
of delivery to the sheriff if due diligence is exercised and
the constable has levied on the property no later than the
next return day.
The Maryland Court of Appeals has said that a lien
fastens upon personal property from the time of delivery
of the writ of ft fa to the sheriff, Prentiss Co. v. Whitman &
Barnes Co., 88 Md. 240, 41 A. 49 (1898) (writ delivered at
11:30 a.m., receiver appointed at 1:00 p.m. and levy at
2:00 p.m.). See also Furlong and Miller v. Edwards, 3 Md.
99 (1852); Selby v. Magruder, 6 H&J 454 (Md. 1825) and
United States v. Levin, 128 F. Supp. 465 (D. Md. 1955).
Cf. Myers & Co. v. Banking & Trust Co., 170 Md. 198, 183
A. 543 (1936) (judgment creditor's writ was not accorded
priority over subsequently delivered writ where he had
issued instructions not to levy which were followed by
sheriff whereas subsequent writ of another was executed).
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Where judgment creditor's writs of fi fa were returned
nulla bona by sheriff, it was held that under Maryland law
he only had an inchoate lien at the time of delivery, which
was destroyed by return of nulla bona. In re Continental
Midway Corporation, 128 F. Supp. 867 (D. Md. 1960) discussed in 21 Md. L. Rev. 173 (1961). For further information see 14 Md. L. Rev. 203, 211 (1954); 14 Md. L. Rev. 311,
318 (1954); 10 M.L.E. 356, Executions §§ 17, 18; 2 POE,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE (Tiffany's ed. 1925) § 666 at p. 624,
(cf. § 631 at p. 589); RHYNHART AND SCHLITZ, MARYLAND
CIVIL PRACTICE BEFORE PEOPLE'S COURTS AND JUSTICES

(1961) § 10.23.
Criminal Law - Sufficiency Of Instruction To Jury
That Verdict Must Be Unanimous. Coby v. State, 225 Md.
293, 170 A. 2d 199 (1961). Defendant was convicted of
rape in the Criminal Court of Baltimore City. Defendant
appealed, contending that the trial court's instruction to
the jury that, "whatever your verdict may be, it must be
unanimous," did not guarantee the rights given to him
by Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which
states in part that every man has a right to a trial by jury
"without whose unanimous consent he ought not to be
found guilty." The Court of Appeals, in a case of first impression, held that in instructing the jury that their verdict must be unanimous, the trial court substantially complied with the requirements of Article 21 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights; 9 MD. CODE (1957) p. 38. The Court
felt that the word "unanimous" which means "having the
agreement and consent of all" was a complete explanation
of the requirement that there be unanimous consent by the
jury. In so holding the Court recognized that a number
of older cases in other jurisdictions had held that failure
to give an "individual juror" instruction was prejudicial
error. State v. Witt, 34 Kan. 488, 8 P. 769 (1885). The
"individual juror" instruction places emphasis on the individual duty of a juror to be convinced of the guilt of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before he consents
to a verdict of guilty. See also, Rhodes v. United States,
282 F. 2d 59 (4th Cir. 1960).
In a number of the more recent cases the courts have
refused to give the "individual juror" instruction stating
that such an instruction is not to be recommended because
it might instill in the juror's mind the idea that he should
reach his own conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of
the defendant without relying on the reasoning and con-
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sideration of his fellow jurors, which may preclude the
exchange of ideas that are oft-times necessary to a just
verdict. Green v. State, 263 Ala. 324, 82 So. 2d 418 (1955).
Further, some courts have indicated that such an instruction lends nothing to the case, the requirement of
unanimity of verdicts being of such general knowledge
that all men may be imputed to have knowledge of the requirement. State v. Logue, 204 S.C. 171, 28 S.E. 2d 788
(1944). For further information see 23 C.J.S. 875, 1069,
Criminal Law, §§ 1295, 1391, 1392; 7 M.L.E. 404, Criminal
Law, § 482; REID'S BRANSON INSTRUCTIONS TO JURIES (3d
ed. 1960) § 75, p. 254.
Double Jeopardy - Attaches Where Court Erroneously
Directs Verdict Of Acquittal During Presentation Of
Government's Case. Fong Foo v. U.S.; Standard Coil
Products Co., Inc. v. U.S.. ...... U.S ....... , 82 S. Ct. 671
(1962) (for prior treatment of this case in the United
States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, see 21 Md. L. Rev.
365 (1961)). The petitioners, a corporation and two of its
employees, were brought to trial before a jury in a district court upon an indictment charging a conspiracy and
the substantive offense of concealing certain material facts
concerning equipment being manufactured for the government. During a trial recess an Assistant United States
Attorney refreshed a witness' recollection of an event, and
upon learning of this conduct the trial judge granted a
motion for acquittal and directed the jury to return verdicts of not guilty stating that the conduct of the Assistant
United States Attorney was a deprivaion of defendant's
civil rights and that the government's witnesses were unworthy of belief. The government then petitioned the
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, for a writ
of mandamus to vacate the judgment of acquittal. The
writ was granted on the ground that the trial judge was
without power to terminate the government's case in midstream and mandamus was the proper remedy. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
order to consider whether, for purposes of the constitutional double jeopardy prohibition as applied in the federal
court system, jeopardy had attached in the proceeding. In
a 7-1 decision the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals and held that once a trial has been terminated by
a judgment of acquittal, regardless of how improvidently
or hastily granted, it could not be reviewed without putting
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the defendant twice in jeopardy and thus violating the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The dissent reasoned that the majority put too much emphasis on the
phrase "final judgment of acquittal" and that in reality
since the trial judge had no power to direct an acquittal
it was a nullity and the defendant could be retried. The
dissent felt that the trial judge's actions violated the fundamental right of the public to have one who has been
legally indicted, be publicly tried on the charge.
Generally in Maryland, a prior conviction or acquittal
bars a second prosecution for the same offense. Scarlett v.
State, 201 Md. 310, 93 A. 2d 753 (1953) cert. den. 345 U.S.
955 (1953); State v. Rosen, 181 Md. 167, 28 A. 2d 829 (1942).
Jeopardy does not attach until a verdict is returned by the
jury. Anderson v. State, 86 Md. 479, 38 A. 937 (1897).
However, an old case states that the verdict returned
must be valid. In State v. Sutton, 4 Gill. 494 (Md. 1846)
the jury returned a verdict of guilty which was defective
in that the jury, while finding defendant guilty on one
count of the indictment, failed to make any finding on the
other. The lower court, after discharging the jury, granted
defendant's motion in arrest of judgment and released
him. On appeal by the State, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that although the jury had returned a verdict which was bad for incompleteness, the lower court
had erred in granting the motion in arrest of judgment and
should have instead declared a mistrial. However, double
jeopardy had not attached so as to prevent the State from
trying the defendant again. The presence of a technical
defect in the verdict itself, as opposed to an objection going
merely to erroneous grounds for directing a verdict, may
distinguish the Sutton case from the subject case. See
also 22 C.J.S. 647, Criminal Law, § 245. For further information see 7 M.L.E. 195, Criminal Law, §§ 91-97; 12
Md. L. Rev. 68 (1951); 7 Md. L. Rev. 364 (1943); 4 Md. L.
Rev. 303 (1940); 3 Md. L. Rev. 184 (1939); 15 Am. Jur. 50,
Criminal Law, §§ 376, 377. See also 74 A.L.R. 803 (1931);
19 Md. L. Rev. 127 (1959).
Evidence - Dead Man's Act Does Not Bar Testimony
Of Creditor Seeking To Administer Intestate Estate. Soothcage v. King, 227 Md. 142, 176 A. 2d 221 (1961). Appellant,
an attorney, was prosecuting a suit for the decedent when
the latter died intestate. After a conversation with the
appellee, the sister of the decedent, the appellant filed an
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application with the Orphans' Court describing himself as
a creditor and asking for letters of administration, which
were granted. Thereafter, the appellee filed a petition for
removal of appellant as administrator. A hearing was held
in the Orphans' Court and appellant was removed as administrator. He appealed to the Circuit Court of Baltimore County where a trial de novo was held pursuant to
1 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 5, § 25. At the trial the judge excluded testimony of the appellant concerning money he
had advanced to the decedent by reason of the Dead Man's
Act, 4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 3, and, at the conclusion
of the hearing, affirmed the ruling of the Orphans' Court
and held that there was no admissible evidence to show
that the appellant was a creditor of the decedent on the
date of the grant of letters. On appeal the Maryland Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling and held that
the Dead Man's Act is not applicable in a proceeding
where one is attempting to establish his rights as a creditor to letters of administration. The Court reasoned that
the Dead Man's Act only excludes "'testimony of a party
to a cause which would tend to increase or diminish the
estate of a decedent by establishing or defeating a cause of
action by or against the estate,"' (150), citing Riley v.
Lukens Dredging & ContractingCorp., 4 F. Supp. 144, 147
(D. Md. 1933), and since the grant of letters to a creditor
does not establish the enforceability of his claim (see
Emmert v. Stouffer, 64 Md. 543, 551, 3 A. 293, 6 A. 177
(1886)) the Dead Man's Act was not applicable.
Previously the Maryland Court of Appeals has held
that the Dead Man's Act was not applicable to parties in
caveat proceedings as to transactions with the decedent.
Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 125 A. 512 (1924); Hendrickson v. Attick, 136 Md. 1, 109 A. 468 (1920); Hamilton
v. Hamilton, 131 Md. 508, 102 A. 761 (1917). However, in
Redgrave v. Redgrave, 38 Md. 93 (1873) in a suit by the
plaintiff attempting to establish her priority as the wife
of the decedent to act as administrator of his estate, the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that under the Dead Man's
Act she was not qualified to testify as to her relationship
with the decedent. See also Browning v. Browning, 224
Md. 399, 168 A. 2d 506 (1961); Whitehurst v. Whitehurst,
156 Md. 610, 145 A. 204 (1929); Bowman v. Little, 101 Md.
273, 61 A. 223 (1905); Denison v. Denison, 35 Md. 361
(1872), but cf. Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 599, 116 A. 2d
145 (1955). For general information on the Dead Man's
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Act see 21 Md. L. Rev. 60 (1961); 97 C.J.S. 581, Witnesses,
§§ 142, 143; 115 A.L.R. 1425 (1938); 91 A.L.R. 1445 (1934);
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1940) Vol. I, § 578, p. 695,
Vol. V, § 1576, p. 435, Vol. VII, § 2065, p. 371.

Inheritance Tax - Limitations On Tax Due On Interest
In Joint Tenancy Where No Formal Administration Or
Inventory Filed In Orphans' Court. State v. Cadwalader,
Exec., 227 Md. 21, 174 A. 2d 786 (1961). In 1938, Caroline
Hall and her sister, Henrietta Mitchell Smith acquired a
fee simple title to certain realty as joint tenants. In 1952,
Caroline Hall died intestate and no formal administration
or inventory was filed in Court concerning her estate, nor
was an inheritance tax paid on the interest passing to her
sister by survivorship as provided by 7 MD. CODE (1957)
Art. 81, § 151. In 1958 when Henrietta Smith died and the
appellee was appointed executor of her estate, the appellant, Register of Wills of Harford County, first learned of
the prior existence of the joint tenancy and he caused an
appraisal to be made in 1959 and the tax to be ascertained.
When the appellee refused to pay the tax, the appellant
brought the present action for inheritance taxes, interest
and penalty due by reason of the death of Caroline Hall.
A special plea of limitations was filed by the appellee under Art. 81, § 212 which provides that "All . . . taxes ...
shall be collected within four years after they shall have
become due, (emphasis added) or else shall be utterly
barred; .... " A replication was filed to this plea and, on
a set of stipulated facts, the Court entered judgment for
the appellee. On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals
reversed the lower court's decision and held that where an
interest in a joint tenancy subject to tax passes without
formal administration or an inventory being filed in
Orphans' Court as provided in Art. 81, § 169, the inheritance tax does not become due so as to commence the running of limitations until the property passing has come to
the attention of the register of wills and he has made an
appraisal of its value.
In so holding, the Court rejected the appellee's contention that under Art. 81, § 167 (procedure when no administration has been taken out within 90 days of death Orphans' Court may have appraisal of real property on
application of interested party) and § 169 (duty of trustee
or person distributing or receiving property subject to tax
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to file inventory in Orphans' Court within 90 days of decedent's death) the tax became due 90 days after Caroline's death. It found that under § 170 which provides,
"[w]henever any property shall pass subject to the inheritance tax . . .and there is no formal administration . . .
and no inventory is filed as required by § 169, it shall be
and become the duty of the register of wills . . .to apply
for the appointment of at least two appraisers to value
any such estate that may come to this attention (emphasis
added) for the purpose of determining the amount of tax
due and payable hereunder, and the tax so ascertained to
be due shall become payable at once to register of wills......
the tax in the instant case did not become due until the
date of the appraisal. The Court felt that the legislature
did not intend "to cast a burden on the register of wills to
keep himself apprised of every death, within or without
his jurisdiction, which might cause inheritance taxes to
become due, whether the decedent was a resident or nonresident, or whether record title holder or not of taxable
property within such jurisdiction" (at p. 26). For further
information see 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 542, 544 (1955); 32 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 431, 467 (1947); 24 Ops. Atty. Gen. 942 (1939);
19 M.L.E. 318, Revenue and Taxes, §§ 281, 282. See also
SYKES, MARYLAND PRACTICE, Probate Law and Practice
(1956) §§ 791-795, pp. 716-719.
Restitution - To Accountant Of Benefit Conferred By
Use Of His Working Papers During Time Of Wrongful
Replevy. Ablah v. Eyman, 188 Kan. 665, 365 P. 2d 181
(1961). Plaintiff wrongfully replevied certain working
papers prepared by the defendant-accountant as an independent contractor in connection with an audit he had prepared for the plaintiff four years previously. The defendant filed an answer and a cross-petition for damages based
on the value the plaintiff had received by copying and
using these papers, while wrongfully replevied, in preparing certain tax papers. The plaintiff filed a motion to
strike parts of the cross-petition and answer, which was
granted as to the allegations which based damages on the
value of the use of the papers to the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Kansas, in reversing
the lower court's decision and allowing the defendant to
recover damages based on the benefit conferred, reasoned
that the allegations sounded in quasi-contract, not tort, and
that "whenever one person commits a wrong or tort against
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the estate of another, with the intention of benefiting his
own estate, as is here alleged, the law will, at the election
of the injured party, imply or presume a contract on the
part of the wrongdoer to pay the party injured the full
value of all benefits resulting to the wrongdoer." (p. 191).
The court felt that had the tortfeasor acquired the papers
rightfully, he would have had to pay an amount approximating their use value; therefore, it would be inequitable
to allow him to wrongfully gain possession of property and
receive a benefit from its use without paying the value of
the use simply because the owner was not damaged to
that extent.
The general trend of authority is in accord with the
instant case and holds a tortfeasor liable for benefits received while wrongfully holding another's property.
Leitner v. G. Boromei Fish Co., 140 Fla. 74, 191 So. 76
(1939) (wrongful replevy); Cottrel v. Gerson, 296 Ill. App.
412, 16 N.E. 2d 529 (1938) aff'd 371 Ill. 174, 20 N.E. 2d 74
(1939) (wrongful distraint by landlord); Riley v. Citizens
Nat. Bank of Waco, 210 S.W. 2d 224 (Tex. 1948) (real
property-tenant wrongfully holding over). A recovery
measured by the benefit conferred instead of merely compensating damage may be restricted to cases where there
has been a deliberate tortious act. Olwell v. Nye & Nissen
Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P. 2d 652, 169 A.L.R. 139 (1946).
However, there is authority that in the replevin action
itself damages are not recoverable by way of rent as such
by reason of the use of the property by the wrongdoer.
Myers v. Walker, 173 Wash. 592, 24 P. 2d 97 (1933) (wrongful attachment). Likewise, in Cumberland C. & I. Co. v.
Tilghman, 13 Md. 74 (1859) the Maryland Court of Appeals
in a suit on a replevin bond for wrongful replevy said,
"[h]is right to success in the action of replevin depending
entirely on his right to possession, in reason, it follows,
that his title to damages must be confined to the extent
of the interference with that possession." (p. 84). For
further information see 169 A.L.R. 143 (1947); 19 Yale
L.J. 221 (1910); 21 Yale L.J. 533 (1912); RESTATEMENT,
TORTS (1939) § 903, Com. b at p. 540; RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION (1937)
§ 128, Com. i at p. 533; § 157 at p. 621.
See also 18 Am. Jur. 164, Election of Remedies, § 46; 38 5th
Dec. Dig. 1808, Replevin, Key no. 83 and 6th Dec. Dig. 1067,
Contracts, Key no. 5; 19 M.L.E. 52, Replevin, § 22.
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Torts - Res Ipsa Loquitur Not Available To Plaintiff
Who Attempts To Prove Specific Acts Of Negligence.
Smith v. Bernfeld, 226 Md. 400, 174 A. 2d 53 (1961). Plaintiff, a customer in defendant's beauty salon, brought a tort
action for injuries sustained when one of defendant's chairs
in which she was sitting toppled over causing her to fall
to the floor and the chair to fall on her. Her declaration
alleged that the accident occurred when she leaned forward to place her pocketbook on the counter in front of her
while sitting in the chair. However, at the trial she testified that the accident occurred when she was settling back
in the chair with her heels hooked under a tubular bar
serving as a footrest. At the trial she attempted to prove
that defendant was negligent in failing to have the chair
properly attached to the floor or in failing to provide a
chair of sufficiently balanced weight to withstand the
weight of a customer leaning forward. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the trial court entered
a judgment n.o.v. for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the lower
court's decision that plaintiff had failed to meet her burden
of proof to establish specific acts of negligence and, also,
rejected the contention that res ipsa loquitur was available
to the plaintiff. The Court reasoned that assuming that
the plaintiff's failure to raise the issue of res ipsa loquitur
did not prevent its consideration on appeal under MD.
RuLES (1961), Rules 885 and 554e, "the plaintiffs' attempt
to establish specific grounds of alleged negligence precludes recourse to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." (409)
Although the instant case indicates that recourse to
res ipsa loquitur is precluded where there is an attempt
to establish specific grounds of negligence, prior Maryland
decisions had indicated only that recourse to res ipsa
loquitur is precluded when the cause of the accident has
been proven or tended to be proven by the plaintiff's or
defendant's testimony. Smith v. Baltimore Transit Co., 214
Md. 560, 566, 136 A. 2d 386 (1957); Maszczenski v. Myers,
212 Md. 346, 353, 129 A. 2d 109 (1957); Coastal Tank Lines
v. Carroll, 205 Md. 137, 106 A. 2d 98 (1954). Where one
wishes to rely on res ipsa loquitur, "it must not appear
from his own evidence, or the evidence adduced in his
behalf, that causes for which the defendant was in no
way responsible produced the injuries for which damages
are sought." Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253,
263, 96 A. 2d 241 (1953). The rationale of this rule is
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aptly stated in Strasburgerv. Vogel, 103 Md. 85, 63 A. 202
(1906) where the court stated that "to exclude, in the
mental process of deduction, a consideration of the intervening, independent and efficient causes directly occasioning the injury and proven by a plaintiff himself and not
attributable to a defendant, would be to predicate actionable negligence of a condition or event which in fact did
not produce the injury and thus allow a recovery against
a defendant on a ground for which he was in no way
answerable." (at pp. 89-90). However, the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur had been held to be available to the plaintiff even though he had pleaded specific allegations of
negligence. Lawson v. Clawson, 177 Md. 333, 343, 9 A. 2d
755 (1939) and cases cited therein. See also Joffre v.
Canada Dry, Inc., 222 Md. 1, 158 A. 2d 631 (1960). For
further information see 11 Md. L. Rev. 102 (1950); 10 Md.
L. Rev. 337 (1949); 3 Md. L. Rev. 285 (1939); 160 A.L.R.
1450 (1946) and 79 A.L.R. 48 (1932). See also 2 HARPER
AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956) § 19.10, p. 1096 and
21 A.L.R. 2d 420 (1952).
Torts - Verdict Awarding Special Damages Without
Damages For Pain And Suffering Upheld. Leizear v. Butler,
226 Md. 171, 172 A. 2d 518 (1961). Plaintiff, a passenger
in a police vehicle driven by a fellow police officer, was
injured as a result of a collision with defendant cab driver.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for his
claimed special damages, consisting of hospital and medical expenses and loss of wages, but allowed nothing for
pain and suffering. The plaintiff, contending that the omission of damages for pain and suffering created an inadequate and invalid verdict, made a motion for a new trial
which was denied. On appeal, the Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the disposition of a motion for a new
trial is within the trial judge's discretion and is not reviewable as to the adequacy of a verdict on appeal even
though the motion is based on the verdict's having omitted
any compensation for pain and suffering. The Court declared that it is firmly established in Maryland that
whether the verdict be excessive or inadequate, the action
of the trial court in allowing or refusing a new trial will
rarely, if ever, be reviewed on appeal. In Chiswell v.
Nichols, 139 Md. 442, 115 A. 790 (1921) an attack on the
verdict's adequacy as a basis for an appeal was answered

176

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

with a citation to 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (Tiffany
ed. 1925) § 349, which upholds the discretionary right of
the trial court in granting or refusing a motion for a new
trial. Cf. Wash., B. & A. R. Co. v. Kimmey, 141 Md. 243,
118 A. 648 (1922). See also Elza v. Chovan, 396 Pa. 112,
152 A. 2d 238 (1959) upholding a verdict awarding even
less than the proven medical expenses.
Decisions concerning the validity of a verdict omitting
pain and suffering but awarding medical expenses generally hold that such a verdict is invalid. Failure to follow
the court's instructions was the ground for rejecting such
a verdict in Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198, 223 S.W. 2d
734, 20 A.L.R. 2d 272 (1949). In accord with this view is
Webster v. City of Colfax, 250 Iowa 181, 93 N.W. 2d 91
(1958); Gomes v. Roy, 99 N.H. 233, 108 A. 2d 552 (1954).
See 3 Am. Jur. 131, Appeal and Error, §§ 399-401; 53 Am.
Jur. 762, Trial, § 1099; 15 Am. Jur. 663, Damages, §§ 231-239.
Cases are collected in 20 A.L.R. 2d 276 (1951). See also 2
M.L.E. 332, Appeals, § 428, and 69 A.L.R. 2d 712 (1960).

